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Dear Professor DeLisi,
Please find attached our revised manuscript entitled “Introduction and Validation of the Juror 
Decision Scale (JDS): An Empirical Investigation of the Story Model” which you kindly invited 
a revised manuscript be submitted. We have taken into account and addressed all reviewer 
comments to the original manuscript and have made revisions accordingly. We hope that the 
responses below and the revisions made, will allow the reviewers decision alongside your final 
editorial decision, to be made with ease.
Sincerely
Prof Daniel Boduszek
Reviewer 1
I have but two minor comments/suggestions for the authors to consider: The bigger picture, 
however, is the potentially important contribution the paper makes through the development of 
the juror decision scale.
Comment 1: The authors should note the limitations to this study posed by the use of a non-
representative sample.
Response 1: Thank you for your comments. The limitations surrounding the study sample 
have now been added within the discussion section (please see page 23).
Comment 2: The authors should either (a) identify and defend in the front-end of the 
manuscript their decision to include the self-esteem scale or (b) simply delete all of this 
material from the paper.  As it is, the inclusion of self-esteem does little to nothing to help the 
authors address their research questions; its inclusion appears pointless.
Response 2: Taking these comments into account, all reference to self-esteem has now been 
removed from the manuscript. Reflecting upon both reviewers making this point, the authors 
agree that using self-esteem as an external variable to display differential predictive validity 
with JDS sub-scales added little but confusion to the manuscript.
Reviewer 2
In a single experiment with mock jurors, the author(s) introduce and validate a new scale 
(Juror Decision Scale or JDS) of juror decision making.  Scale construction is based on the 
theoretical assumptions of the Story Model explanation of decision making.  Using this scale, 
they found that a model with complainant believability, defendant believability, and decision 
confidence provided the best fit for the data. There were some spectacular aspects to this study 
including the development of the experimental trial and the nature and size of the participant 
sample.  In its present form, however, there are number of issues with the paper that limit the 
impact of this very important data set:
Comment 1: In my view, the author(s) has failed to capitalise on the strengths of their data—
leaving us with a somewhat clinical (and not very interesting) series of statistical analyses. 
(a) For example, the reader gets no sense of what decision the jurors made or whether their 
decisions changed after deliberation.  
(b) Did any of the jurors’ characteristics (gender, age, education) influence their initial 
decision?  Their subsequent decision?  I understand that the focus of the paper is on an 
experimental evaluation of the Story Model, but in limiting their data analysis to this point 
they have robbed the reader of much more interesting story.  
Response 1: Thank you for your comments and the value you see in the publication of the 
manuscript after revisions. Please see how we have addressed/respond to your specific points 
below.
(a) Whilst we understand the reviewer’s concerns surrounding the statistics provided, these are the 
standard series of analyses necessary within any validation of a new scale. Having said this, an 
additional table (Table 1) has now been included which displays individual and collective verdict 
decision frequencies, with a description also provided in the results section (page 16) detailing 
the outcome of the McNemar Chi-square test for association between pre- and post-deliberation 
verdict decisions. Additional analysis surrounding the association between the three JDS sub-
scales and verdict decisions at both time points has also now been included in the manuscript 
(Table 6) with a description in the results section (page 18) and interpretation of these 
associations provided within the discussion. We hope the inclusion of this additional information 
and interpretation surrounding verdict outcomes, leads the reviewer to conclude a more 
interesting analysis is now provided.
(b) The inclusion of analysis surrounding the role of juror psychosocial characteristics upon verdict 
decision making is a substantial area in itself and forms the basis of a separate manuscript. In 
line with scientific convention surrounding what should be included within the validation of a 
new measure, the inclusion of analysis pertaining to such psychosocial characteristics is beyond 
the scope and purpose of the present paper.
Comment 2: Many of the potentially interesting (and sometimes puzzling) correlations between 
variables only emerge in the Discussion without a description of the full correlation matrix in 
the Results. 
(a) Although it makes sense that there would be a negative relation between complainant 
believability and rape myth acceptance (although we have no idea the size or strength of this 
relation here).
(b) The negative relation between self-esteem and decision confidence makes less sense.  Given 
that the full correlation matrix is not presented, the reader has no way to evaluate the size of 
strength of this relation.  What other interesting correlations were not discussed?
Response 2: A correlation matrix is not included in the manuscript as the associations with 
external variables such as rape myth acceptance serve only to display differential predictive 
validity with the three JDS sub-scales e.g. that they measure distinct latent constructs. 
(a) The size and strength of the association between all JDS sub-scales and external variables 
(rape myth acceptance and verdict decisions) are already presented in Table 6. We 
respectfully draw the reviewer’s attention to fact that the standardized beta value (β) in Table 
6 is the value that is universally used to display the size and strength of the relationship 
between continuous variables in linear regression analyses and the odds ratio value (OR) 
universally reported for effect size within binary logistic regression. Nonetheless, for clarity 
of expression and to further assist the reader, these effect size indicators have now also been 
included within the discussion section where the associations between such variables are 
discussed. 
(b) As highlighted above self-esteem has now been entirely removed from the manuscript. 
Please see the above points outlining what values display the size/strength of associations.
Comment 3: There are places in the paper where a potentially important idea is glossed over 
or not fully explained.  For example, on page 22 it is not clear to me why the defendant would 
uniformly be considered part of the in-group while the complainant would be part of the out-
group.    
Response 3: Taking these comments into account, all reference to self-esteem has now been 
removed from the manuscript. Reflecting upon both reviewers making this point, the authors 
agree that using self-esteem as an external variable to display differential predictive validity 
with JDS sub-scales added little to the manuscript but confusion. Greater depth of explanation 
of the JDS sub-scales association with AMMSA scores and verdict decisions is now provided, 
with the findings further situated in line with past research (please see page 21 & 22).
Comment 4: No attempt is made to tell the reader what the possible practical implications of 
the data might be.  What conclusions can be drawn that would be useful to a lawyer or a judge?
Response 4: Practical implications/applications in light of the legal system are now discussed 
on page 23.
Minor issues:
1. Throughout the paper, the author(s) uses human verbs with non-human nouns.  For 
example, research does not seek, examine, conclude—researchers do these things.
 This has now been addressed throughout the manuscript.
 
2.       McCabe, Krauss, & Lieberman (2010) is not in the reference section.
 This has now been included (see page 28)
3. To give more depth to the procedure, it would be helpful to provide some sample 
items from each of the measures (i.e., JDS, AMMSA, RSES).
 This has now been included for the AMMSA scale (see page 14) and reference 
made to the table where the JDS items/scale can be found (see page 13 & 14). As 
outlined above the RSES is no longer included in the manuscript. 
 We introduce a new Juror Decision Scale (JDS) validated within an experimental 
paradigm 
 JDS consists of three subscales (complainant & defendant believability, and decision 
confidence)
 Good composite reliability and differential predictive validity of JDS is reported
 This empirical contribution adds to the Story Models conceptualisation of the 
certainty principles underlying juror decisions
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Abstract
Purpose: To develop and validate a self-report measure of individual juror decision making 
within criminal trials, based on theoretical features set out in the Story Model of juror decision 
making. 
Methods: The Juror Decision Scale (JDS) and Acceptance of Modern Myths about Sexual 
Aggression (AMMSA) measure were completed by 324 jury-eligible participants split across 
27 jury panels, after observing a rape trial re-enactment high in ecological validity. 
Dimensionality and construct validity of the JDS was investigated using traditional 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) techniques alongside confirmatory bifactor analysis at two 
time points (individual juror verdict decisions pre- and post-deliberation). Three competing 
models of the JDS were specified and tested using Mplus with maximum likelihood robust 
estimation. 
Results: Bifactor model with three meaningful factors (complainant believability, defendant 
believability, decision confidence) was the best fit for the data at both decision points. Good 
composite reliability and differential predictive validity were observed for the three JDS 
subscales.
Conclusion: Alongside demonstrating its multidimensional conceptualisation, the JDS 
development permits future empirical testing of the Story Model theoretical assertions 
surrounding juror decision making. Present findings also provide early evidence of a certainty 
principle assessment process governing individual verdict decision formation. Theoretical and 
practical applications are discussed.
Keywords: Juror Decision Scale (JDS); Story model; Confirmatory factor analysis; Differential 
predictive validity; Jury decision making, certainty principles
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Introduction and Validation of the Juror Decision Scale (JDS): 
An Empirical Investigation of the Story Model 
Numerous theoretical models have been advanced in an attempt to explain how jurors 
arrive at verdict decisions within criminal trials. Competing explanations differ in their attempt 
to account for individual decision formation or collective group decision-making, which 
constitute two distinct processing tasks jurors must undertake throughout the duration of a trial. 
Yet despite distinctions between juror-versus-jury level decision models, most theorising to 
date has centred upon individual juror processing. Dual process models such as Epstein’s 
(1994) Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory, alongside Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) 
heuristic processing shortcuts, have gained plentiful support, with empirical explorations 
reporting features of both models to account for many processing stages jurors undertake 
(Brekke & Borgida, 1988; Bornstein & Greene, 2011; Hawkins & Scherr, 2017; Kovera 
McAuliff, & Hebert, 1999; Krauss, Lieberman, & Olson, 2004; Lieberman, 2002; Mears & 
Bacon, 2009). Bayesian models have also been drawn upon, proposing a process by which 
individual jurors judge discrete pieces of information upon a theorised continuum of guilt. Juror 
weightings are posited to shift as every new piece of evidence is independently assessed, 
allowing an overall probability of guilt to be constructed by the end of trial (Ostrom, Werner, 
& Saks, 1978). Nonetheless, despite aforementioned explanations accounting for many 
processes thought to underlie juror decisions, no theory has been so widely adopted or 
comprehensive in its account of juror decision formation as Pennington and Hastie’s (1992) 
Story Model. 
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Attempting to provide a complete account of the decision-making process undertaken, 
the Story Model posits jurors to be actively engaged in a narrative construction of information 
surrounding a case. A combination of evidence presented during trial, existing world 
knowledge, and preconceived attitudes are said to be used by jurors to construct one or more 
possible interpretations of the event, termed stories (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). Personal 
inferences and pre-existing bias are considered most likely to be incorporated within the 
narrative interpretations jurors construct when key elements of the stories are not presented as 
evidence (Pennington & Hastie, 1988). Thus, trials lacking compelling evidence, including 
CCTV or eyewitness testimony, appear most at risk from juror bias. In essence, the theory 
suggests that when hearing competing accounts of the same incident during trial, typically 
including one version put forward by a defendant and an alternative account put forward by a 
complainant, individual jurors construct differing narrative interpretations of what they believe 
actually occurred. At the end of trial and prior to deliberation, jurors then select one such 
narrative as the dominant, accepted version of events, they believe to be true (Pennington & 
Hastie, 1992). Yet before this occurs, competing stories or narratives are thought to undergo 
three differing phases of processing termed; story construction, verdict representation, and 
story classification. 
Whilst the verdict representation phase relates to juror’s ability to identify and 
understand differing verdict options available and the story classification phase surrounds 
juror’s determination of which verdict option best matches the story accepted (according to the 
perceived goodness of fit between the two), the story construction phase is considered most 
important for individual decision formation (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). Here, jurors are 
thought to draw primarily upon evidence presented during trial, as well as prior knowledge 
held around what typically occurs in similar events, in making sense of the case (Pennington 
& Hastie, 1993). Prior knowledge is conceptualised as factual information, alongside 
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assumptions and attitudes jurors bring to trial that are relevant to the issues under scrutiny. 
From the combination of such information, competing stories are thought to be concurrently 
constructed as variants of what may have happened in the case, though only one of multiple 
stories constructed will ultimately be selected (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). 
Competing defendant and complainant stories are subsequently assessed by individual 
jurors according to what Pennington and Hastie (1992) term, certainty principles. Thus, a story 
constructed will only be accepted by an individual juror when considered to have adequate:  
coverage of crucial pieces of evidence integrated within an account (i.e., good fit between 
evidence presented and a given version of events), coherence regarding how consistent (i.e., 
lacks internal contradictions), complete (i.e., no aspects of the story are missing from the 
evidence available), and plausible (i.e., the story is credible and could possibly have happened) 
a story appears to be, and finally the uniqueness of the story, surrounding whether alternative 
equally credible and comprehensive explanations could emerge from the evidence available. 
Pennington and Hastie (1992, 1993) posit only upon satisfying each of these certainty principle 
elements within the story construction stage, will any story be accepted by an individual juror, 
over other competing possibilities. Once one story is accepted and matched to a verdict option 
available, a verdict decision will be made. Taken together, the Story Model considers 
individual juror decision formation is best conceptualised as representing two core factors 
surrounding, belief in a defendant’s story and belief in a complainant’s story, distinct factors 
thought to be independently ascertained through certainty principle assessments. Consideration 
of theoretical discussion surrounding the role of confidence in jurors’ story assessments and 
verdict classifications (Pennington & Hastie, 1993), as well as the importance attributed to 
confidence in decision pathways more broadly within jury literature (Hawkins & Scherr, 2017; 
Matthews, Hancock, & Briggs, 2004; Willmott & Sherretts, 2016), a third theorised factor of 
decision confidence is also conceptualised.
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Empirical Support for the Story Model
Early attempts to examine jurors’ mental representation of evidence offered initial 
support of a story construction process underpinning juror decision making. In one study, 
Pennington and Hastie (1986) exposed participants to a videotaped re-enactment of a murder 
trial and asked mock jurors to provide individual verdict decisions, before probing the decision-
making process undertaken. Jurors reported constructing evidence into a story structure format 
in order to make sense of the evidence and described a process by which they drew more 
heavily on evidence that supported their accepted version of events than other evidence 
presented. In fact, the authors found evidence presented during mock trials that did not directly 
fit with the story constructed, was much less likely to be discussed by the jurors, regardless of 
its individual merit. Where important elements of a juror’s story were not presented as 
evidence, the researchers found mock jurors simply made inferences based upon personal 
experiences and assumptions, ensuring the accepted story was deemed coherent and complete. 
Adopting an alternative approach, Pennington and Hastie (1988) presented mock jurors with a 
written summary of a case which they were required to render a verdict upon before 
undertaking a memory recognition test of trial evidence. Results displayed memory of trial 
information was best when information being recalled was consistent with a story matching 
the verdict decision participants had made and poorest for story inconsistent evidence. Further, 
in studies that varied the presentation of evidence from the traditional narrative format (where 
witnesses were asked questions about the event sequentially), to an item-by-item format (where 
witnesses were asked about discrete aspects of the case non-sequentially), results displayed 
presentation order not only differentially affected a juror’s memory of evidence but led to 
different verdicts being returned in respect of the same case. The traditional narrative format 
was found to allow easier credibility assessments of witness testimony to be undertaken than 
item-by-item evidence presentation (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). The authors report that when 
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asked to make global judgements of the evidence (rather than item-by-item evaluations), jurors 
seemingly adopted a system of certainty principle processing of competing witness stories 
before deciding upon a chosen verdict (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). The authors made this 
assertion based upon qualitative responses mock jurors gave when asked to describe their 
decision-making process and thus more objective, quantitative analysis of the data gathered 
was not possible. To date, all studies report jurors’ mental representations of trial evidence 
were underpinned by causally connected sequences of events, in which selected testimony 
appeared to be constructed into story formats. Whilst Pennington and Hastie’s (1988) study 
displayed the same evidence would be considered stronger when presented in a story format, 
the greatest influence upon final decisions was found to be the strength of one story when 
compared to another (Pennington & Hastie, 1988, 1993). Contemporary studies appear to 
support the Story Model assertions surrounding juror’s narrative construction of evidence 
underpinning individual decision-making (Blume, Johnson, & Paavola, 2007; Huntley & 
Costanzo, 2003). Ellison and Munro’s (2015) qualitative examination of the role of written 
judicial instructions upon juror comprehension of legal guidelines also explored the process by 
which mock jurors reached verdict decisions. Analysis of deliberations led the legal scholars 
to again conclude a narrative construction of trial evidence was apparent. 
However, the Story Model is not beyond criticism. Pennington and Hastie (1992) offer 
little explanation surrounding the process by which individual juror decisions remain stable or 
change during group-deliberations and provide no account of the exact verdict decision-making 
process undertaken by individual juror’s during or post-deliberation. With much juror-level 
research dismissed as unrepresentative of collective agreed jury-level decisions, ultimately 
required within criminal trials before a verdict can be given (Darbyshire, 2011; Kapardis, 
2014), the need to examine how individual juror decisions made pre-deliberation may interact 
with the group deliberation process remains apparent. Despite being considered crucial to the 
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acceptance of one witness story over another, no researchers have directly empirically tested 
whether certainty principle assessments underpin the decisions individual jurors make during 
trial. Authors have sought to substantiate the premise that jurors construct competing stories 
during trial, however to date no researchers have directly sought to test whether the certainty 
principles set out within the Story Model do in fact govern the acceptance of one story over 
another. Individual constructs thought to be comprised within the story construction phase have 
been tested in isolation; including plausibility judgements between criminal narratives (Canter, 
Grieve, Nicol, & Benneworth, 2003; Jackson, 1996), as well as narrative coherence and 
completeness assessments of guilt (Voss & Van Dyke, 2001; Yale, 2013). Further, no empirical 
attempt to date has established whether a juror’s greater belief in a complainant or defendant’s 
story has any significant association with the verdict decision jurors ultimately make. 
Current Study 
Whilst the Story Model provides a detailed conceptualisation of the decision-making 
stages thought to underlie a juror’s decision to vote guilty or not guilty and remains the 
dominant explanation within the field, a lack of empirical research exists which seeks to verify 
important features of the theory. In particular, a central component termed certainty principles 
have, to the authors’ knowledge, never been empirically tested or verified. Therefore, the aim 
of the current study was to develop a valid measure of individual juror decision making relative 
to criminal trials, directly integrating theoretical features of Pennington and Hastie’s (1992) 
Story Model into an empirically testable scale. Accordingly, the factorial structure and 
construct validity of the scale developed, termed the Juror Decision Scale (JDS) (complainant 
believability, defendant believability, decision confidence), was tested using confirmatory 
factor analysis and confirmatory bi-factorial techniques pre and post juror deliberation. 
Composite reliability and differential predictive validity of the JDS was also investigated.
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Methods
Sample 
A self-selected opportunity sample of 352 participants were recruited from a large 
urban town in the North of England. Based upon recent census data, the town has a population 
of approximately 140,000 people, making it the 11th largest town in Great Britain (Office for 
National Statistics, 2016). Of this population, electoral polls suggest around 96,000 live within 
the parliamentary constituency of the town, where approximately 75,400 are aged 18 and 
above, meaning that such individuals are eligible to vote in government elections and thus, in 
principle, eligible for jury service (Electoral Calculus, 2015). Targeting prospective 
participants through advertising posters distributed throughout the town centre and university 
campus, the present sample consisted of members of the general population, as well as 
undergraduate and postgraduate students. All volunteers were screened prior to participation 
in line with English juror eligibility criteria (i.e., age, residential status, criminal history, mental 
health), with most of those excluded from partaking declined on the basis of age or lack of 
permanent residency status. Due to the non-attendance of eight participants for their allocated 
mock trial, the data from three entire jury panels were removed prior to analysis. The remaining 
sample was therefore 324 participants, distributed across 27 separate mock trials, each with 12 
jurors in total. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 70 years old (M = 24.86, SD = 9.34), and 
comprised of 210 females (64.8%) and 114 males (35.2%). In total, 213 participants reported 
their ethnicity as Caucasian (65.7%), 58 reported being of South Asian descent (17.9%), and 
53 as Black Afro-Caribbean (16.4%). Most participants reported having a level of education 
below a bachelor’s degree (76.0%), with a smaller proportion reporting being educated to at 
least university level (24.0%). The demographic profile of study participants was overall 
Running head: JUROR DECISION SCALE
10
representative of the general population of the local region surrounding ethnicity and 
educational attainment. All participants gave up their time voluntarily and received only a gift 
token of nominal value for taking part.
Study procedure 
Attempting to improve upon methodological limitations present within much jury 
research to date, typically utilising brief written vignette trial scenarios and lacking any group 
deliberation element (for a review see McCabe, Krauss & Lieberman, 2010), the present study 
sought to undertake mock trials in a manner exhibiting greater ecological validity. Accordingly, 
study procedures were designed to reflect the same sequential stages undertaken within genuine 
criminal jury trials. Following consultation with an expert panel of criminal justice practitioners 
including, an experienced Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) lawyer, a practising criminal 
barrister, and three senior police investigators from two differing British police forces, a rape 
case collectively deemed to be typical of those often brought before the courts was selected as 
a case most likely to elucidate the greatest understanding surrounding how jurors reach 
decisions during trial. All panel members independently identified the same three features as 
present within many contested rape cases (voluntary intoxication, lack of independent 
witnesses, previous acquaintanceship with the alleged perpetrator) and accordingly it was 
decided that these components should form the basis of the case transcript selected for 
experimentation. A systematic trawl of legal case databases LexisNexis and the British and 
Irish Legal Information Institute (BILII) were conducted adopting the following search criteria; 
transcripts were required to include (1) voluntary intoxication, previous acquaintanceship, and 
a general lack of independent witnesses; (2) the sexual offence of rape was recorded; (3) 
sufficient detail surrounding the alleged offence and the events preceding/following the rape 
incident, as well as the competing accounts put forward by the complainant and defendant; (4) 
largely evidentially ambiguous, meaning that roughly equal information corroborated and 
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contradicted both parties’ accounts of what happened. As these databases store genuine trial 
transcript information of cases that have previously been heard at trial within the UK, the legal 
threshold of any case selected had been met, with regards to the evidence available being 
deemed significant enough to warrant a criminal trial. Cases which met the stipulated criteria 
were qualitatively reviewed until a total fifteen cases were shortlisted. These transcripts were 
then further scrutinised on the basis of including enough detail of the legal arguments put 
forward by the prosecution and defence, such that mock trial re-enactment would be possible.
Having selected one case that matched the aforementioned criteria, the trial transcript 
was subsequently reduced in length to allow a shorter mock trial scenario to be devised. A clear 
narrative was constructed relative to the case, whereby a summary of the undisputed facts, the 
complaint’s version of events, the defendant’s version of events, a condensed version of both 
the prosecution and defence questioning of both parties, and the judge’s instructions, were 
scripted. 
In order that the judge’s instructions were accurately summarised from the original trial 
transcript, as well as ensuring all evidence was in accordance with English law, lawyers from 
the expert CJS panel were again consulted. Next, this scripted scenario was developed into a 
videotaped mock trial simulation and thus a local filmmaker, as well as professional actors 
were recruited for the roles of the complainant (female), defendant (male), and court clerk. 
Finally, experienced criminal lawyers were enlisted to take on the role of the legal professionals 
including the role of the judge, to present mock-juror participants with the case. Special 
permission was granted to record the mock trial recreation within a genuine courtroom in the 
North of England and the duration of the final condensed version was 25 minutes long.
Adopting an experimental design, participants were recruited to take part in one of 27 
replications of the same mock trial. In an attempt to simulate the randomisation of mock jurors 
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into respective trials, participants were assigned at random to different mock trials listed for 
experimentation over the coming weeks. On the day of experimentation, participants were first 
asked to complete a number of psychosocial assessments within the context of a mock 
courtroom. Immediately after, the twelve-person jury panels were shown the 25-minute 
videotaped rape trial re-enactment on a large screen within the mock courtroom. In an attempt 
to ensure that participants were actively attending to the video and approached the decision-
making task in a similar way to that of a real jury, mock jurors were informed that whilst the 
video was a re-enactment, the content therein related to that of a genuine rape allegation that 
had previously gone to trial and that all of the testimony they would hear was drawn from 
evidence presented within the real case. Once the trial video had concluded and mock jurors 
had heard all testimony and evidence in the case, participants were asked to remain in their 
seats prior to deliberation. Each participant then completed the JDS and recorded their 
preferred verdict (“How do you find the defendant on the charge of Rape? Guilty or Not 
Guilty”) allowing pre-deliberation individual juror decisions to be assessed. Jurors were 
reminded not to discuss the case until they were in the deliberation room.
Next, in accordance with genuine trial deliberation procedures, participants were 
reconvened within a separate jury deliberation room where they were asked to collectively 
discuss the case in an attempt to reach a unanimous verdict. An experimenter was not present 
in the room during deliberations. Where participants agreed upon a unanimous verdict within 
the allotted one-hour time frame, they were reconvened within the mock courtroom to render 
their verdict. Where participants were not unanimous after one-hour deliberating, an extra 
thirty minutes was provided in an attempt to reach a majority verdict, after which point all 27 
jury panels had successfully arrived at verdict, recorded by an experimenter. Finally, jurors 
were again asked to complete the JDS and record a final verdict preference (Guilty/Not Guilty), 
allowing post-deliberation juror decisions to be assessed. Before doing so, jurors were 
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instructed that the verdict decisions they were being asked to make related to them as an 
individual and may therefore not necessarily reflect the collective verdict that had just been 
returned. Once completed, participants were debriefed and thanked for partaking. In total, each 
mock trial experiment lasted between 120 and 180 minutes from arrival to debriefing. 
Scale Development  
In designing the JDS as a measure of individual juror verdict decision-making, we 
sought to incorporate theoretical features termed certainty principles described in Pennington 
and Hastie’s (1992) Story Model. Specifically, the model suggests competing versions of 
events (i.e. the complainant versus defendant stories), are independently and implicitly 
assessed by individual jurors according to a number of prescribed certainty principles. Item 
generation for the JDS relied directly upon the Story Model’s theoretical conceptualisation of 
these certainty principles. As such, seven items pertaining to the extent to which a 
juror/respondent felt a complainant’s story had coverage, coherence, consistency, 
completeness, plausibility, uniqueness, and overall believability, were devised. Seven identical 
items pertaining instead to the defendant’s story were also included in the scale. In accordance 
with the story model assertions, these complainant versus defendant certainty principle items 
were hypothesised to constitute two separate dimensions within the scale, which, in line with 
the Pennington and Hastie’s (1992) theory, should be highest for the individual whose story is 
matched to a verdict decision. Consideration of theoretical discussion surrounding the role of 
confidence in jurors’ story assessments/verdict classifications (Pennington & Hastie, 1993), 
two global items pertaining to decision confidence were also included, hypothesised to 
comprise a separate dimension within the scale. In total, the scale developed comprised of 16-
items distributed across three hypothesised dimensions (Complainant Believability, Defendant 
Believability, Decision Confidence) (see Table 4 for all scale items). Where the Story Model 
is accurate in its theoretical account of the role of certainty principles underpinning individual 
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juror decision formation, higher scores would be expected to be found on the complainant 
believability sub-scale for jurors who returned a guilty verdict, and higher on the defendant 
believability sub-scale where jurors retuned a not guilty verdict. Therefore, all JDS scale items 
measure respondents’ self-reported assessments of how believable they determine a 
complainant and defendant to be, having heard all evidence in a particular jury trial (or mock 
trial for research purposes), as well as their self-reported confidence relating to the individual 
verdict decision made in a given case.  
Measures
The Juror Decision Scale (JDS) is a 16-item self-report measure designed to assess 
individual juror decision making (see Table 4 for all scale items). The measure consists of three 
subscales; Complainant Believability (seven items), Defendant Believability (seven items), and 
Decision Confidence (two items), with all items scored on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = “not at 
all” to 5 = “extremely”). Higher scores on the Complainant Believability sub-scale indicates 
greater juror/respondent belief in the complainant’s story, with lower scores indicating reduced 
belief in a complaints account. Higher scores on the Defendant Believability sub-scale indicates 
greater juror/respondent belief in the defendant’s story, with lower scores indicating a reduced 
belief. Higher scores on the Decision Confidence subscale indicates greater juror/respondent 
confidence in the accuracy of the verdict decision given. All scale items are measured 
according to the individual juror/respondents’ decisions relative to the evidence heard within a 
particular case or trial. The JDS should be administered pre and post group deliberation.
Acceptance of Modern Myths about Sexual Aggression (AMMSA; Gerger, Kley, 
Bohner, & Siebler, 2007) is a 30-item unidimensional self-report inventory developed to 
measure attitudes held towards rape and sexual aggression in diverse populations (e.g. item 9 
“If a woman invites a man to her home for a cup of coffee after a night out this means that she 
Running head: JUROR DECISION SCALE
15
wants to have sex” and item 27 “Many women tend to misinterpret a well-meant gesture as a 
sexual assault". Responses are measured on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = “completely 
disagree” to 7 = “completely agree”). Total scores range from 30 to 210, with higher scores 
indicating greater acceptance of myths surrounding sexual aggression (Cronbach’s alpha = 
0.92).  
Analytical Procedure 
To investigate the dimensionality and construct validity of the JDS, traditional 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) techniques and confirmatory bifactor analysis procedures 
(Reise, Moore, & Haviland, 2010) were undertaken at both verdict decision time points (VD1 
– pre-deliberation and VD2 – post-deliberation). Three alternative models of the JDS were 
specified and assessed using Mplus 7.4 (Muthen & Muthen, 2015) with maximum likelihood 
robust (MLR) estimation. The CFA was used to determine factor loadings and identify the best 
factorial structure.
At both verdict decision time points, Model 1 is a one-factor solution, where all 16 JDS 
items load onto a single latent factor. Model 2 is a correlated three-factor solution, where items 
load on the complainant believability factor (items 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8), defendant believability 
factor (items 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15), and decision confidence factor (items 1 and 16). 
Model 3 (see Figure 1) is a bifactor conceptualisation with one general factor (all items) of 
juror decision making, alongside three subordinate factors as described in Model 2. 
Insert Figure 1 about here
The overall fit of each model and the relative fit between the three differing models 
were assessed using a range of goodness-of-fit indices. The Chi-square statistic (χ2), 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI; Cronbach, 1990), Tucker Lewis Index (TLI; Tucker & Lewis, 
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1973), Root-Mean-Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA; Steiger, 1990) with the 
associated 90% confidence interval (90% CI), Standardised Root Mean Square Residual 
(SRMR), and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC; Schwarz, 1978) were reported for all 
models. For CFI and TLI, values above or approaching 0.95 are indicative of good model fit 
and above 0.90 acceptable model fit (Bentler, 1990; Hu & Bentler, 1999). Likewise, for 
RMSEA and SRMR, values less than 0.05 suggest good model fit and below .08 acceptable 
model fit (Bentler, 1990; Hu & Bentler, 1999). For BIC values comparing alternate models, 
the lowest value is indicative of the best fitting model (Nylund, Asparouhov, & Muthen, 2007).
Finally, due to criticisms surrounding Cronbach’s alpha coefficient indicators of 
internal consistency (Raykov, 1997; 1998), composite reliability was used within the present 
analysis to assess internal reliability of the JDS factors, with values above 0.60 typically 
considered acceptable (Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2000).
Results
Frequencies of individual juror verdict decisions pre- and post-deliberation and 
collective group decisions are presented in Table 1. Whilst the number of participants who 
recorded a guilty verdict decreased post-deliberation with the number of individual not guilty 
verdict preferences increasing, results of a McNemar's Chi-square test for association displayed 
no significant change occurred between pre- and post-deliberation, 2 (1, N = 324) = 2.16, p = 
.142. Overall, most trials resulted in a collective not guilty verdict returned (N = 22) with just 
a minority of jury panels returning a guilty verdict (N = 5).
Descriptive statistics for the three JDS factors (Complainant Believability, Defendant 
Believability, and Decision Confidence) at both verdict decision time points (VD1 = pre-
deliberation; VD2 = post-deliberation), are presented in Table 2. 
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Insert table 1 about here
Insert table 2 about here
Fit indices for three alternative models of the JDS at both verdict decision time points (VD1, 
VD2) are presented in Table 3. At both time points, the one-factor model and correlated three-
factor model were rejected, based upon exhibiting CFI and TLI values considerably below the 
0.95 approximate level of acceptance (Bentler, 1990; Hu & Bentler, 1999) and RMSEA and 
SRMR values considerably above the 0.05 level of acceptance. Taken together the combination 
of fit statistics indicate the bifactor model of the JDS provides the best fit to the data at both 
verdict decision time points: VD1 (CFI = 0.94, TLI = 0.92, SRMR = 0.04, RMSEA = 0.07 
[90%CI = 0.05/0.08], BIC = 11119.99), VD2 CFI = 0.96, TLI = 0.94, SRMR = 0.04, RMSEA 
= 0.07 [90%CI = 0.05/0.08], BIC = 10700.38). Notably, the BIC statistic for the bifactor model, 
at both verdict decision time points, was lower than that displayed for all alternative models.
Insert Table 3 about here
The appropriateness of the bifactor model of the JDS can also be determined through 
examination of factor loadings for statistical significance. Inspection of the factor loadings for 
the three JDS factors (Table 4 and 5) provides clear evidence of the appropriateness of 
including these latent factors in the scoring of the JDS. Overall, standardized factor loadings 
are higher for three grouping factors than for the general factor. Therefore, all three JDS 
subscales (complainant believability, defendant believability, and decision confidence) should 
be considered in research and practical application.
Insert Table 4 about here
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Insert Table 5 about here
The correlations between the three JDS factors, relative to Verdict Decision 1, were 
low (complainant believability and decision confidence r = 0.10, p > 0.05; complainant 
believability and defendant believability r = -0.30, p < 0.001; defendant believability and 
decision confidence r = 0.14, p < 0.05) indicating little overlap between the variables. 
Correlations between the JDS latent factors relative to Verdict Decision 2 were also low 
(complainant believability and decision confidence r = 0.05, p > 0.05; complainant 
believability and defendant believability r = -0.36, p < 0.001; defendant believability and 
decision confidence r = 0.25, p < 0.001) further indicating little overlap between the variables. 
Nonetheless, whilst there appears to be no significant overlap between JDS variables at either 
decision points, assessing differential predictive validity of a multidimensional scale is 
recommended (Boduszek & Debowska, 2016; Carmines & Zeller, 1979). In the present 
analysis, this involved ensuring that the three dimensions of the JDS were associated 
differentially with external variables. 
Table 6 displays the results of the regression analyses at both decision time points. In 
relation to Verdict Decision 1, complainant believability forms a significant negative 
relationship with rape attitudes (AMMSA), whereas a significant positive relationship is 
observed between defendant believability and AMMSA scores. While negatively correlated, 
decision confidence was non-significantly related to AMMSA scores. For Verdict Decision 2, 
AMMSA was again significantly negatively correlated with the complainant believability 
dimension and significantly positively correlated with defendant believability. Though 
positively correlated, decision confidence was non-significantly related to AMMSA scores. 
Both pre- and post-deliberation logistic regression results display a significant positive 
relationship between complainant believability and guilty verdict selections, whereas a 
significant negative relationship is observed between defendant believability and guilty verdict 
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selections. Decision confidence was positively associated with guilty verdicts at both decision 
points, though this relationship was statistically non-significant. These differential correlations 
between JDS subscales and external variables confirm the correctness of multidimensional 
solution of JDS.
Insert Table 6 about here
Internal reliability of the JDS factors was calculated using composite reliability in place of 
traditional Cronbach’s alpha (as suggested by Boduszek & Debowska, 2016; Raykov, 1997). 
Using the formula displayed below where; CR = composite reliability of the factor score, λi = 
standardised factor loading, and Var (Ɛi) = standard error variance, results demonstrate good 
internal reliability for the JDS factors pre- and post-deliberation.
At Verdict Decision 1, results displayed that confidence in decision = 0.82, complainant 
believability = 0.70, and defendant believability = 0.79, alongside the general factor = 0.74, 
exhibited good internal reliability. Likewise, at Verdict Decision 2, confidence in decision = 
0.83, complainant believability = 0.72, and defendant believability = 0.85, as well as the 
general factor = 0.79, exhibited good internal reliability.
Discussion
Pennington and Hastie’s (1992) Story Model provides a detailed conceptualisation of 
the information processing stages thought to underlie juror verdict decisions. Yet whilst 
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credited for its comprehensiveness and widely regarded as the dominant explanation of juror-
level decision making, researchers are yet to empirically test and verify important theoretical 
features underlying the model. One central feature suggests whilst hearing competing 
defendant and complainant accounts during trial, jurors assess the extent to which they believe 
such stories according to a subscribed set of certainty principles. Based upon the varying extent 
to which each story is considered to be consistent, complete, and plausible (amongst other 
certainty principles), the theory posits competing stories are rated in terms of overall 
believability, with the account deemed to be most believable, used to construct the individual 
juror’s chosen verdict decision. Yet with no prior inventory in existence, the need to develop a 
self-report scale directly integrating the theoretical certainty principles into an empirically 
testable measure remained apparent. The main objective of the current exploration was 
therefore to develop a valid and reliable scale permitting the Story Model’s conceptualisation 
of individual juror decision formation (certainty principles) to be examined. Another objective 
was to evaluate the dimensionality and construct validity of the proposed Juror Decision Scale 
(JDS) using confirmatory techniques. Specifically, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and 
confirmatory bi-factor analysis was undertaken upon a large community sample of mock-jurors 
following their exposure to a simulated rape trial and completion of the JDS pre and post-
deliberation. 
It has previously been suggested that in order to fully explore the factorial structure of 
a proposed measure, a number of alternate conceptually sound solutions should be tested 
(Boduszek & Debowska, 2016; Reise, Moore, & Haviland, 2010). In the current study three 
alterative models of the JDS were identified and tested at both pre- and post-deliberation 
verdict decision time points (a one-factor model, a three-factor model, and a bifactor model 
with three grouping factors), using confirmatory techniques. Results displayed that the only 
acceptable solution for the 16-item JDS at both verdict decision points (as indicated by all 
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model fit statistics) was the bifactor model with three grouping factors (Complainant 
Believability, Defendant Believability, and Decision Confidence), while controlling for a 
general factor. Since the majority of covariation between the observed indicators were 
explained by the three grouping factors, at both decision points, these factors formed the basis 
for creating the instrument’s subscales (see Reise, Moore, & Haviland, 2010). According to 
Boduszek and Debowska (2016), when compared with traditional CFA procedures, bifactor 
modelling allows the validity of a single factor to be assessed alongside incorporating elements 
of construct multi-dimensionality. Adopting this approach subsequently elucidated the JDS as 
a multi-dimensional concept. 
Further, whilst the three JDS factors displayed little overlap with one another, the need 
to establish differential predictive validity between sub-scales on a multidimensional scale is 
considered advantageous (Carmines & Zeller, 1979). Ensuring sub-scales measure separate 
theoretical, as opposed to statistical, factors by establishing differential predictive validity 
thereby allows conceptual distinctiveness to be reliably ascertained (Boduszek & Debowska, 
2016). Indeed, the present results displayed that across both verdict decision time points, the 
three JDS factors correlated differently with external measures. For example, complainant 
believability was significantly negatively associated with rape myth acceptance (as measured 
using the AMMSA; Gerger et al., 2007) both pre-deliberation (β = -0.16) and post-deliberation 
(β = -0.24). Conversely, defendant believability significantly positively associated with 
AMMSA scores, both upon pre-deliberation (β = 0.23) and post-deliberation (β = 0.16) verdict 
decisions. Such relationships display the important role that pre-trial bias appears to have upon 
juror decision making, with rape attitudes shown to be directly associated with juror beliefs in 
a defendant’s account of an alleged rape, though unsurprisingly, not with that of the 
complainant. Such findings directly support those reported in prior research in that, greater 
acceptance of sexually aggressive myths appears to reduce a juror’s propensity to believe a 
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rape complainant’s testimony (Dinos, Burrowes, Hammond, & Cunliffe, 2015; Ellison & 
Munro, 2010; Finch & Munro, 2005; Pollard, 1992; Raitt & Zeedyk. 1997; Temkin & Krahe, 
2008; Whatley, 1996). Relative to mock jurors’ individual verdict decisions both prior to (OR 
= 1.62) and following group deliberation (OR = 1.45), complainant believability was also 
shown to be significantly positively associated with guilty verdict selections, whereas 
defendant believability was instead, significantly negatively associated with guilty verdict 
decisions pre- (OR = 0.68) and post-deliberation (OR = 0.78). Particularly interestingly, this 
indicates that the greater a juror’s belief in a rape complainant’s testimony, the more likely it 
is that a guilty verdict will be returned. Yet contrastingly, where a juror exhibits greater belief 
in the defendant’s story, a not guilty verdict is more probable. The totality of such findings 
thereby provides early support for Pennington and Hastie’s (1992) certainty principle assertions 
in that, heightened scores on the complainant believability subscale not only appear to co-exist 
with reduced scores in defendant believability, but when measured in association with verdict 
preferences, appears to be directly predictive of the verdict decision that jurors ultimately make. 
As such, results support Pennington and Hastie’s (1992) assertions that prior to selecting a 
verdict, jurors appear to assess competing witness accounts in terms of a subscribed set of 
certainty principles, in order to determine which story they deem most believable, before voting 
accordingly. Shown to be significantly associated in opposing directions with rape myth 
acceptance and verdict decisions, assessments made according to certainty principle items 
included in the JDS (surrounding a stories completeness, plausibility, coherence amongst 
others), may not only be drawn upon to decide which story will ultimately be selected 
(Pennington & Hastie, 1992) but appear to be influenced in themselves by prior attitudes jurors 
held. Alternatively put, whilst the certainty principle items comprised with the JDS are clearly 
important determinants upon individual decision formation as first theorised, these assessments 
appear to be influenced in themselves by preconceived attitudes jurors hold.
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The present study ought to be considered in light of some limitations. Most pertinent is 
the use of self-report measurement that the JDS relies upon in its assessment of juror decisions 
and as such, is associated with possible response bias (see Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & 
Podsakoff, 2003). Additionally, the current study procedure relied upon validating the JDS 
within the context of an English mock rape trial utilising a sample consisting of both 
community and student mock jurors. With debate surrounding the generalisability of student 
samples within jury research and studies reporting differences in both attitudes and cognitive 
processing styles in student as opposed to community samples (for competing reviews see 
Keller & Weiner, 2011 and Bornstein et al., 2017), future explorations should see researchers 
seek to replicate the validation of the JDS within a more representative sample. Thus, to ensure 
the scale’s utility as an accurate assessment of certainty principle processing applicable to 
genuine juror decision making, future samples should be drawn from electoral voting and 
driver registration registers adopting the same process in which trial jurors are drawn. 
A number of practical implications emerge from the present research and development 
of the JDS. Firstly, results display greater belief in a complainant’s version of events to be 
directly associated with the juror’s propensity to return a guilty verdict and contrastingly, 
greater belief in the defendant’s account, associated with juror’s reluctance to return a guilty 
verdict. Whilst it is perhaps routinely taken for granted by justice systems around the world 
that jurors return verdicts which match true and accurate interpretations of the evidence, 
questions around juror comprehension of legal instructions and malicious or biased decision 
making has long brought this assumption into question (Dhami, Lundrigan & Mueller-Johnson, 
2015; Ellison & Munro, 2010; Ellsworth & Reifman, 2000; Semmler & Brewer, 2002).  
Though specific instruction comprehension was not directly tested here, the present findings 
offer justice systems and trial judges at least some minor reassurance that individual juror 
decisions were related and matched to juror interpretations of the facts. Whilst further 
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systematic research clearly remains necessary to examine the role of prejudice upon verdict 
decision making as well as instruction comprehension, it appears that jurors do not routinely 
make verdict selections that do not match the evidence as they interpret it.  The development 
of the JDS also provides an opportunity for criminal justice practitioners, in particular trial 
lawyers, to utilise the measure as a tool for examining likely juror interpretations of particular 
evidence pre-trial. Within a North American trial consultancy context where evidence can be 
shown to mock jurors prior to the genuine case being presented in court, the JDS provides a 
more reliable empirically grounded measure of individual juror decision making than 
traditionally less scientific approaches (see Oostinga & Willmott, 2017; Seltzer, 2006). Within 
future research, additional mock trial scenarios varying by crime type and the judicial 
procedures of that country should also be tested to examine the validity of the JDS more 
broadly. Where legislation permits, future explorations should also see researchers seek to 
revalidate the JDS beyond experimental conditions with genuine juror respondents pre and post 
juror-deliberation, particularly within a North American context where jurors can discuss cases 
post-trial.
Overall, current findings provide an empirical contribution to an almost exclusive 
theoretical literature surrounding the Story Model’s conceptualisation of the certainty 
principles. Whilst several studies have sought to substantiate claims that jurors construct 
competing narratives during trial and others have examined the importance of particular story 
features in isolation including plausibility, coherence, and completeness upon an assessors 
determination of credibility and guilt (Campbell, Menaker, & King, 2015; Canter, Grieve, 
Nicol, & Benneworth, 2003; Hine & Murphy, 2017; Jackson, 1996; Voss & Van Dyke, 2001; 
Yale, 2013), no researchers to date have developed and validated a complete scale which 
permits comprehensive testing of such an assertion. With existing juror bias scales adequately 
testing the importance of legal attitudes upon verdict decisions (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983; 
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Lecci & Myers, 2008; Lundrigan, Dhami, & Mueller‐Johnson, 2016), the need for an empirical 
test of the decision making process itself remained apparent. As such, the development of the 
Juror Decision Scale alongside demonstrating its validity and multidimensional 
conceptualisation, permits future empirical testing of the Story Model theoretical assertions 
surrounding juror decision making and provides early evidence of a certainty principle 
assessment process governing individual juror verdict decision formation.
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Figure 1. Bifactor model of the JDS; G = general factor of JDM (items 1-16); COMP = 
Complainant Believability (items 2-8); DEF = Defendant Believability (items 9-15); CON = 
Decision Confidence (items 1 & 16)

Table 1
Individual and Collective Verdict Decision outcomes (n =324) 
Note: Group Verdict = collective jury panel decision; VD1 = Individual Verdict decision 1 (pre-deliberation); VD2 
= Individual Verdict decision 2 (post-deliberation).
Decision Guilty                       
N (%)
Not Guilty                
N (%)
Group Verdict 5 (18.5%) 22 (71.5%)
Individual VD1 145 (44.8%) 179 (55.2%)
Individual VD2 133 (41.0%) 191 (59.0%)
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for JDS factors pre-deliberation (verdict decision 1), post-deliberation 
(verdict decision 2), and AMMSA.
Variables M SD Mdn Observed 
Min.
Observed 
Max.
JDS VD1
Decision Confidence 7.09 1.44 7.00 2 10
Complainant Believability 22.32 4.72 22.00 10 33
Defendant Believability 22.71 4.29 23.00 8 35
AMMSA 93.70 25.74 91.00 37 161
JDS VD2 
Decision Confidence 7.57 1.60 8.00 2 10
Compliant Believability 21.27 5.12 21.00 7 35
Defendant Believability 23.03 4.83 23.00 10 35
Note: JDS = Juror Decision Scale; VD1 = Individual Verdict decision 1 (that participants made pre-
deliberation); VD2 = Individual Verdict decision 2 (that participants made post-deliberation); AMMSA = 
Acceptance of Modern Myths about Sexual Aggression total score.
Table 3
Fit Indices for Three Alternative Models of the JDS, during stage VD1 (pre-deliberation) and stage VD2 (post-deliberation).
Stage Models χ2 df CFI TLI RMSEA 90% CI SRMR BIC
VD1 1. One-factor 1149.72* 104 .49 .41 .16 .17/.19 .16 12034.38
2. Correlated 3 factors 813.79* 101 .90 .89 .10 .08/.12 .07 11201.76
3. Bifactor 204.42* 85 .94 .92 .07 .05/.08 .04 11119.99
VD2 1. One-factor 1606.68* 104 .52 .45 .21 .20/.22 .17 11980.06
2. Correlated 3 factors 353.86* 101 .90 .89 .09 .08/.10 .07 10785.36
3. Bifactor 199.60* 85 .96 .94 .07 .05/.08 .04 10700.38
Note. JDS = Juror Decision Scale; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; CI = Confidence Interval; df = degrees of freedom; RMSEA = Root-Mean-Square Error of 
Approximation; SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual; TLI = Tucker Lewis Index; BIC = Bayesian Information Criteria; χ2 = chi square goodness 
of fit statistic. * Indicates χ2 are statistically significant (p < .05).
Table 4
Standardized Factor Loadings for the Three JDS Factors and General Factor (G) pre-deliberation (VD1).
MCSI-R items G CONF COMP DEF
1. Thinking about your individual verdict decision of ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’, how confident are you that 
you have made the correct decision?
.14* .82***
2. How well did the evidence match and cover what the complainant said happened? .34*** .42***
3. How complete was the complainant’s story in the sense that no aspects were missing or left 
unsupported by the evidence?
.35*** .54***
4. How plausible was the complainant’s version of events, in that you think what they said happened, is 
both possible and likely? 
.64*** .43***
5. How coherent was the complainant’s story, meaning that the different stages described as happening 
were logically connected?
.49*** .53***
6. How unique was the complainant’s account, in that you feel it was the only possible explanation of the 
evidence heard?
.34*** .61***
7. How consistent was the complainant’s version of events with the evidence presented overall? .36*** .51***
8. Overall, how much do you believe the complainant’s version of events? .76*** .43***
9. How well did the evidence match and cover what the defendant said happened? .08 .61***
10. How complete was the defendant’s story in the sense that no aspects were missing or left unsupported 
by the evidence?
.03 .73***
11. How plausible was the defendant’s version of events, in that you think what they said happened, is 
both possible and likely?
.57*** .55***
12. How coherent was the defendant’s story, meaning that the different stages described as happening 
were logically connected?
.25* .75***
13. How unique was the defendant’s account, in that you feel it was the only possible explanation of the 
evidence heard?
.54*** .39***
14. How consistent was the defendant’s version of events with the evidence presented overall? .38** .63***
15. Overall, how much do you believe the defendant’s version of events? .74*** .47***
16. Finally, how confident are you overall that you have reached the correct verdict decision in this case? .01 .84***
Note. Factor loadings are statistically significant at * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. CONF = Decision Confidence; COMP = Complainant Believability; DEF 
= Defendant Believability.
Table 5
Standardized Factor Loadings for the Three JDS Factors and General Factor (G) post-deliberation (VD2).
Note. Factor loadings are statistically significant at * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. CONF = Decision Confidence; COMP = Complainant Believability; DEF 
= Defendant Believability.
MCSI-R items G CONF COMP DEF
1. Thinking about your individual verdict decision of ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’, how confident are you that you 
have made the correct decision?
.11 .76***
2. How well did the evidence match and cover what the complainant said happened? .39*** .62***
3. How complete was the complainant’s story in the sense that no aspects were missing or left unsupported 
by the evidence?
.29** .79***
4. How plausible was the complainant’s version of events, in that you think what they said happened, is both 
possible and likely? 
.76*** .37***
 5. How coherent was the complainant’s story, meaning that the different stages described as happening were 
logically connected?
.41*** .51***
6. How unique was the complainant’s account, in that you feel it was the only possible explanation of the 
evidence heard?
.47*** .57***
7. How consistent was the complainant’s version of events with the evidence presented overall? .63*** .49***
8. Overall, how much do you believe the complainant’s version of events? .83*** .35***
9. How well did the evidence match and cover what the defendant said happened? .30*** .67***
10. How complete was the defendant’s story in the sense that no aspects were missing or left unsupported by 
the evidence?
.24*** .72***
11. How plausible was the defendant’s version of events, in that you think what they said happened, is both 
possible and likely?
.48*** .66***
12. How coherent was the defendant’s story, meaning that the different stages described as happening were 
logically connected?
.17* .76***
13. How unique was the defendant’s account, in that you feel it was the only possible explanation of the 
evidence heard?
.41*** .53***
14. How consistent was the defendant’s version of events with the evidence presented overall? .32*** .72***
15. Overall, how much do you believe the defendant’s version of events? .63*** .62***
16. Finally, how confident are you overall that you have reached the correct verdict decision in this case? .12 .92***
Table 6
Associations between the three JDS Factors and External Variables.  
Verdict Decision 1 Verdict Decision 2
Variable
Guilty Verdict                  
(χ2 = 236.50, p < .05)
OR (95% CI)
AMMSA (F [3, 319] = 
11.61, p < .001)
β (95% CI)
Guilty Verdict              
(χ2 = 190.10, p < .001)
OR (95% CI)
AMMSA (F [3, 319] = 
12.76, p < .001)
β (95% CI)
Decision Confidence 1.13 (.88/1.45) -0.03 (-.13/.08) 1.03 (.84/1.27) 0.01 (-.11/.11)
Complainant Believability 1.62*** (1.45/1.81) -0.16** (-.27/-.05) 1.45*** (1.32/1.59) -0.24*** (-.35/-.12)
Defendant Believability 0.68*** (.60/.76) 0.23*** (.11/.34) 0.78*** (.71/.85) 0.16** (.04/.27)
Note: Verdict Decision 1 = Individual Verdict decision 1 (made pre-deliberation); Verdict Decision 2 = Individual Verdict decision 2 (made post-
deliberation); Guilty Verdict = Individual juror guilty verdict selections; AMMSA = Acceptance of Modern Myths about Sexual Aggression total score; ** p 
< .01, *** p < .001


